TEHRAN- Farhikhtegan examined Mossad’s objectives in fueling livelihood‑related protests. Recent regional developments—particularly Netanyahu’s trip to the United States and his meeting with Trump—indicate that the Zionist regime pursues several major goals through involvement in Iran’s domestic protests.

The first goal is to transform economic protests into security crises. It is clear that livelihood demands have a social base, and the Zionists are well aware of this reality and its dimensions in Iran. Thus, they attempt to inject political and radical slogans into these gatherings, pushing them toward security confrontations and polarizing society. The second goal is to legitimize foreign intervention. By supporting certain groups, they seek to create a lever of pressure against Iran. The ultimate goal is to reduce the government’s and security forces’ focus on external threats and divert all national energy toward internal issues. The Zionist regime previously attempted, during the 12‑day war, to undermine Iran’s internal cohesion by creating turmoil, but failed. This historical experience shows that the antidote to the enemy’s strategy lies in public awareness of the origins of provocative messages circulating in cyberspace.

Vatan-e-Emrooz: Israel’s shift in approach toward Iran

Vatan-e-Emrooz analyzed Israel’s changing approach toward Iran. According to the paper, after carefully assessing the failures of the 12‑day war, the Zionist regime has fundamentally altered its strategy. It is no longer willing to risk a direct attack and wait for internal unrest. The new strategy focuses on generating insecurity and widespread turmoil inside Iran, pushing the country into domestic conflict and then, in a weakened state, executing external aggression. More precisely, the model has shifted from “first military attack, then civil war” to “first civil war, then military attack.” This strategic change, adopted based on the experience of the 12‑day war, now turns every domestic protest—even a brief labor demonstration over currency fluctuations—into an opportunity to inject instability. Experts believe that since the war six months ago, Israel has concentrated on the role of internal factors in weakening Iran. A simple economic protest, magnified by media coverage and foreign support, can be transformed into a wave of insecurity. This approach not only reduces the risks of direct military confrontation but also enables external actors to put pressure without incurring high military costs.

Arman‑e-Melli: US threats have a political and security nature

The issue of Iran’s nuclear activities has consistently been one of the central axes of political and diplomatic disputes in recent years at the international level. For this reason, the United States has adopted a confrontational approach based on maximum pressure. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers these demands and pressures illegal, in violation of international agreements, and contrary to the national interests of the Iranian people. Repeated U.S. threats against Iran are less technical or legal in nature and more political and security‑driven. These threats can largely be explained as part of Washington’s strategy to contain Iran regionally and secure the interests of its allies in the Middle East, particularly Israel. In this context, Netanyahu’s trips to the United States have consistently been accompanied by efforts to highlight the “Iranian nuclear threat,” reinforcing political pressure on Tehran. Overall, Iran’s nuclear dispute is less a purely technical or legal matter than a battleground of competing interests, narratives, and strategies among regional and extra‑regional powers. Its consequences affect not only Iran‑U.S. relations but also regional stability and the future of nations’ access to what is called nuclear knowledge.

Sharq: The trajectory of the crisis ahead

Shargh reviewed Abbas Araghchi’s recent article in The Guardian. This article can be seen as a multilayered text that goes beyond a mere media statement, carrying diplomatic messages and indirect warnings about the trajectory of the crisis ahead. In an atmosphere where Tel Aviv seeks to highlight security narratives and portray Iran as the epicenter of threat and instability, such a text may represent a calculated effort to contain tensions, moderate the psychological climate, and prevent escalation. On another level, Araghchi’s article can be interpreted as a continuation of the tradition of “diplomatic coding”—an attempt to send indirect signals to the other side, indicating the existence of a narrow window for dialogue. In the past, when legal and political balances had not yet fully shifted against Iran, this method could be considered part of an active initiative. Under current conditions, however, Iran is no longer one of the decisive parties at the negotiating table but has instead become the subject of negotiation itself. While Araghchi’s text is measured and defensible in terms of diplomatic discourse, at the strategic level, it underscores the necessity that diplomacy, in the new circumstances, requires serious reconfiguration and avoidance of costly optimism.